The legal system as advertised holds that no man (or corporation) is above the law. 9 Our government is "a government of laws, and not of men."
10
Among other things, this means that legal rules are announced in advance, with clarity, not changed ex post; market actors face the same rules regardless of their wealth or political influence, and no economic actor has the power to change the rule in light of an unpleasant economic outcome.
11
Simply stated, if a business enterprise faces insolvency then it must face the legal consequences of insolvency, which should not be averted through a government rescue. 12 Otherwise, economic incentives are distorted as creditors begin to respond to government guarantees (implicit or explicit) with an expanded supply of credit, and management becomes less risk averse in view of the government's guarantees of failure. 13 Competitors, in turn, will seek to become too-big-to-fail ("TBTF") so that they too may enjoy government guarantees and a lower cost of capital.
14 Some competitors will be unable to compete with large subsidized rivals and will fail. 15 This massive distortion of incentives undermines the primary virtue of free markets: the creation of incentives and disincentives for maximum human productivity. 16 Nevertheless, in 2008-2009, the U.S. government expended massive funds and made massive guarantees to the financial sector, which ultimately benefited reckless bank managers and creditors who had not bargained for a government guarantee of the funds they extended to risky financial firms. 17 This practice brazenly violated any 9 Scholars have long recognized that interest groups with concentrated members and concentrated wealth have superior incentives to organize and therefore benefit disproportionately from the legislative process. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 11, 165 (1971) (stating that very large groups will not pursue organizations to influence public goods like law because rational actors will instead assume that they can free ride on the efforts of others). 10 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) . 11 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 65-66 (2004) (noting that stripped of all its technicalities the rule of law means that government acts only in accordance with "'rules fixed and announced before-hand [which allows one] to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge'") (quoting Friedrich Hayek). 12 Until recently, it was thought that banks facing insolvency are put into receivership under the supervision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC" REV. 1943 REV. (2008 , available at http://www.atypon-link.com/doi/abs/10.1257/aer.98.5.1943 (finding that "zombie" firms, that is firms that would be insolvent without assistance, are associated with reduced investment in non-"zombie" competitors). 16 Indeed, laissez faire enthusiasts have long argued that the maintenance of appropriate incentives was the primary reason society must tolerate high inequality and otherwise unacceptable levels of poverty. Steven A. Ramirez, Bearing the Costs of Racial Inequality: Brown and the Myth of the Equality/Efficiency Trade-Off, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 90 (2004) . 17 Banks that are deemed TBTF have an advantage in the capital markets and many bank mergers are apparently pursued to attain TBTF status rather than the operating efficiencies. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 32-33. short term. Over the longer term, once the zombie banks become accustomed to their privileged status as wards of the state they are apt to gamble for resurrection and undertake very risky lending in vain hope that more risk could pull their firms out of the government's care. 29 The government subsidies at the heart of the TBTF approach create industrywide distortions in incentives and excessive risks. 30 Thus, economies burdened with zombie banks frequently suffer adverse economic consequences for years to come. This article will show that the bailouts of 2008 and 2009 were contrary to the rule of law as well as sound economics, and that the law must respond to this gross injustice by imposing a regime in accordance with notions of the rule of law and rationalizing any future government assistance to failing firms which present systemic risk. 31 Part I will review the details of the bailouts of [2008] [2009] , highlighting the many ways in which they violated the rule of law, appropriately conceived. Part II will demonstrate that while the economy required government intervention to avoid a cataclysm, it did not require the subprime bailouts that occurred. Part III will articulate a rationalized legal framework that should govern bailouts, based upon the use of civil and criminal sanctions to impose disincentives upon managers of firms flirting with TBTF status. These proposed sanctions impose costs directly upon the CEOs of firms that have permitted their business to become so large and complex that it imposes fiscal and macroeconomic costs upon society in general. The goal is a match between penalties and costs. The chasm between an optimized approach to government bailouts and the legal reality of the bailouts forms the foundation for the conclusion of this article: the rule of law must govern government assistance going forward to prevent further bailouts driven purely by political power and economic caprice.
I. THE SUBPRIME BAILOUTS OF [2008] [2009] In what can only be described as an orgy of reckless financial management, a number of very large financial firms pursued short-term profits without regard to risks borne by their firms in one of the greatest 29 Much of this excessively risky credit found its way into the U.S. residential real estate market via subprime loans.
33
Managers seemingly lost all concern for the well-being of their firms and their shareholders in the pursuit of obscenely large compensation payments or golden parachute payments.
34
Various managers exploited the real estate and credit bubbles in various ways, but essentially, managers ignored clear risks in the vain hope that easy money would keep the party going indefinitely. 35 By the spring of 2007, however, the music stopped playing, and with the party winding down the inevitable hangover meant one thing for ordinary Americans: economic crash. 36 Moreover, the reckless lending in America soon infected the entire global financial system and ultimately caused a global synchronized recession costing trillions in foregone output.
37
The first expenditure of federal funds in support of a failed financial institution involved the collapse of Bear Stearns (a large investment bank) in the spring of 2008. The Federal Reserve System (the "Fed") initially agreed to lend billions to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase on March 14, 2008.
38 Shortly thereafter, Bear Stearns merged with JPMorgan Chase for $10 a share or less than 10 percent of Bear Stearns' market value just months before.
39
The Fed facilitated the merger through $30 billion in special financing. 40 The Fed took control of a portfolio of Bear Stearns assets amounting to $30 billion. 41 absorb any losses from the remaining $29 billion on a non-recourse basis to JPMorgan Chase. 42 JPMorgan Chase received $30 billion in cash but was only obligated to repay $1 billion. 43 The Fed received $30 billion in Bear Stearns assets that it manages today through an entity called Maiden Lane I. 44 The Fed acted under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 45 a provision the Fed had not used since the Great Depression. 46 Thus far, it appears that the Fed has lost about $3.4 billion on the Bear Stearns bailout. 47 The hope that the Bear Stearns bailout would stabilize the financial system was short-lived. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers ("Lehman"), a large investment bank, declared bankruptcy, in the absence of federal assistance. 48 The failure of Lehman appeared to quickly deliver a lethal blow to financial stability. 49 The fall of Lehman was followed by instability in global money markets, and commercial credit subsequently froze. 50 Some commentators argue that Lehman's failure did not cause the financial market instability. 51 Nevertheless, the consensus view is that the failure of Lehman led directly to unprecedented financial chaos. 52 In any event, "the market was . . . bewildered when the Fed rescued certain firms and not others," and the decision to rescue Bear Stearns and then permit Lehman to fail is often cited as the most prominent example of the ad hoc nature of the government's bailouts. 53 Other commentators suggest that such uncertainty has long been inherent in the current ambiguous and discretionary regime. 54 One fact is clear: Lehman's failure did immediately precede more financial problems, particularly a run on money market funds, after one such fund, which was holding Lehman debt "'broke the buck.'" 55 Within a few days of the fall of Lehman, the world's largest insurance company, AIG, teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. 56 AIG apparently guaranteed the obligations of a number of obligors of other powerful financial firms through an unregulated instrument known as credit default swaps. 57 If AIG had failed, it could have inflicted up to $180 billion in losses on its credit-default swap counterparties. 58 Among those exposed to the failure of AIG was the large investment bank, Goldman Sachs ("Goldman"). Goldman, whose alumni included then Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson and his predecessor in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, apparently would lose $13 billion if AIG failed. 59 Goldman was not alone, and if AIG failed there was a substantial prospect that a number of other large financial firms would follow. 60 Consequently, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson engineered a bailout (amounting to a maximum $182.5 billion) to keep AIG out of liquidation at a cost to the taxpayer, as of fall of 2009, of $86.8 billion. 61 The statutory basis of the bailout was again section 13(3).
62
Bernanke and Paulson were not finished. On September 18, 2008, they gathered Congressional leaders to inform them that unless they funded a massive federal bailout immediately, "'we may not have an economy on Monday.'" 63 Within days, the Treasury posted a three page bailout bill on its website that called for a $700 billion bailout of unnamed financial firms, to be administered solely by the Treasury, free of all oversight. 64 When asked the basis of the $700 billion amount, a Treasury official stated that they wanted it to be a "really large number." 65 The American people weighed in strongly against such a bill. 66 This caused the House of Representatives to pause. 67 But, the Senate loaded the bill with sufficient pork that the House ultimately succumbed and passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") on October 3, 2008. 68 The legislation, hastily conceived and passed in a panic, originally contemplated the purchase of "troubled assets" by the Treasury. 69 This original conception was abandoned in favor of equity injections in banks and other financial firms. 70 On October 13, 2008, Paulson gathered the CEOs of the nation's largest financial firms and forced them to accept billions in government aid, whether they desired the aid or not, and whether they needed the aid or not. 71 As of mid-2009, the government's net investment in the financial sector pursuant to the TARP program exceeded $248.8 billion. 72 Even this proved insufficient. Citigroup continued to flounder even after receiving $25 billion in TARP funds. On November 23, 2008, the Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC agreed to inject another $20 billion from the TARP funds and essentially guaranteed the value of $306 billion of Citigroup's assets. 73 The Treasury did not negotiate for any changes in management and only received warrants and preferred stock in exchange. 74 Commentators suggested that "[t]he $306 billion guarantee was an undisguised gift." 75 On February 27, 2009, the Treasury further acted to strengthen Citigroup's capital structure by agreeing to convert $25 billion in preferred shares to common equity shares. 76 There is some confusion regarding the cost thus far of bailing out Citigroup. 77 On one hand, the government is sitting on an $11 billion profit from its common shares. 78 On the other hand, the ultimate cost of the government's guarantee of asset values is uncertain at best. 79 This constituted the first use of the FDIC insurance funds to bail out a bank during the 2008-2009 crisis and it acted pursuant to its emergency authority to address systemic risk. 81 On January 16, 2009, the government announced that it would inject a further $20 billion into Bank of America and guarantee the value of essentially $118 billion in loans in exchange for preferred shares. 82 Bank of America ultimately decided not to take advantage of the asset guarantee program and has resisted paying the fees associated with the program. 83 As of early fall of 2009, Bank of America was negotiating to repay part of its TARP money and end the asset guarantee. 84 Thus, it is impossible to calculate the losses from these additional Bank of America bailouts. The FDIC, which acted in concert with the Fed and the Department of the Treasury, again based its actions on the systemic risk exception to limits on its use of deposit insurance funds.
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There were many additional government efforts to bail out the financial sector. For example, the government has expended $96 billion to 75 prop up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government sponsored entities that were subject to enhanced government regulation and were always viewed as implicitly backed by the U.S. government. 86 The failure of these two entities would have destabilized the housing market and led to huge losses to the financial sector. 87 In fact, it is fair to say that without these two entities the real estate market would cease to function. 88 Further, the FDIC guaranteed all bank debt (under the "Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program"), giving banks access to funds at a lower cost. 89 As of September 4, 2009, the FDIC guaranteed $304 billion of bank debt. 90 The Fed also plans to purchase $1.45 trillion in mortgage-backed securities and has purchased $740 billion to date. 91 This means the Fed is the largest purchaser of mortgages in the world. 92 All of this activity effectively protected banks from losses on their holdings of mortgage securities and enhanced bank profitability.
The financial sector also benefited from changes in accounting standards. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB") is responsible for promulgating accounting standards. 93 Yet, the FASB's authority is always subject to Congressional power. 94 In the heat of the financial crisis the FASB was pressured by Congress and lobbied by the financial industry to revamp market accounting and to allow banks greater discretion in valuing assets. 95 This materially buoyed profits at financial firms and shored up their capital. 96 In the first quarter of 2009, experts estimate that bank earnings would have been 42% lower without the changes; in the second quarter bank profitability would have declined 14%.
97 This amounted to a stealth bailout.
All of this bailout activity concentrated economic power primarily This led to charges of inappropriate political influence and even crony capitalism-particularly with respect to the bailout of AIG which richly benefitted Goldman Sachs.
101
The New York Times obtained records under the Freedom of Information Act showing that Paulson spoke to the current CEO of Goldman Sachs twenty-four times during the week of the AIG bailout.
102 Closely associated charges of inconsistency and arbitrary action were leveled against Paulson's actions; John Taylor, a Stanford economics professor, argued that the "'lack of a predictable framework for intervention'" resulted in market uncertainty.
103 "The pattern of government intervention in the past year is at times bewildering. . . . . Creeping uncertainty of this sort would inevitably slow and distort the economy. The government vastly overpaid for the rights and shares purchased; in fact, the Congressional Oversight Panel that reviewed the initial TARP transactions found that the Treasury received assets worth $66 for every $100 spent. 107 The money often went to banks that did not want or need the funds, as well as to unscrupulous banks. 108 There were no requirements imposed on the use of the funds, and little or no effort was made to trace the use of the funds.
109
Banks that received funds subsequently used funds to buy competitors, to host golf junkets, or redecorate their offices. 110 The Attorney General of New York issued a report showing that $32.5 billion was paid out in bonuses to senior executives even while losses mounted and firms took in government 98 President Hank, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2008, at 46. 99 Id. assistance. 111 Finally, there was no effort to assure that banks receiving bailout monies could survive; stress-testing was not required until spring of 2009, well after hundreds of billions had been expended. 112 The intent of all the bailouts seems lost-the money disbursed did little to free up credit markets.
It is virtually impossible at this date to calculate the final net loss to the taxpayer from these government interventions. There is reason to think that any estimate as of the date of this writing is apt to be too low. The commercial real estate debacle is just getting started. 113 The government has failed to arrest the collapse of the residential real estate market or to materially slow the rate of real estate foreclosures. 114 Indeed, while the government expended hundreds of billions in bailout funds for large banks, and still has $2.2 trillion in bailout loans outstanding, its mortgage relief program disbursed a relatively paltry sum of $22 billion 115 to help stem a flood of foreclosures that some sources estimate at thirteen million over the next five years. 116 In the spring of 2009, Harvard economist, Kenneth Rogoff, estimated the hole in the financial system to be $2 trillion and suggested that taxpayers could pay $1 trillion without succeeding in recapitalizing the financial sector appropriately. 117 Combined with lost GDP, it seems certain the bailouts will be a multi-trillion dollar catastrophe.
The next section will show that macroeconomic science suggested that these programs would ultimately fail to reignite lending, and by extension, economic growth. Moreover, economists and other scholars specifically warned that distorted incentives implicit in TBTF would lead to financial instability, in the first instance, and that the fact that the government extended assistance to firms teetering towards bankruptcy would further distort incentives well into the future.
II. THE MACROECONOMICS OF BAILOUTS
Economists greeted the bailouts with intense skepticism.
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According to former Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), Simon Johnson, the financial sector has become too politically powerful.
119 Their political power contributed to the onset of the subprime crisis and is now impeding a rational government response. 120 Specifically, Johnson maintains that the terms of the TARP capital infusions were "grossly favorable to the banks themselves."
121 Johnson claims that this reality mirrors that of many developing nations facing a financial crisis. 122 Unfortunately, too often, those nations could not wrest control of the financial sector from the reckless financial elites that engineered the crisis due to their political power.
123
Johnson maintains that the "economic solution is seldom very hard to work out."
124 It requires only the political will to "scale up the standard Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation process" whereby shareholders and unsecured creditors are wiped out, failed management is terminated, and the banks (with deleveraged balance sheets) are sold off (perhaps piecemeal) into the private sector. (denouncing "hypocrites who spewed . . . laissez-faire . . . capitalism" and "allowed the biggest debt bubble ever to fester without any control, and have caused the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression" now overseeing "the biggest government intervention . . . in the recent history of humanity, all for the benefit of the rich and the well connected"). 119 Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46. 120 Johnson notes that political influence has been central to the crisis: elite business interests . . . played a central role in creating the crisis, making everlarger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
Id. at 49. 121 Id. at 53. 122 The IMF economists echo former chief IMF economist Simon Johnson:
Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason-the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit . . . oligarchy, running the country rather like a profitseeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders . . . . They reckon-correctly, in most cases-that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
Id. at 47-48. 123 Id. at 48. 124 Id. at 47. 125 Johnson, supra note 119, at 54. 126 Id.
prevented from ever again being too-big-to-fail; thus, "banks that remain in private hands must be subject to size limitations." 127 Other high profile economists joined the chorus of adverse commentary.
128 Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, bemoaned the policies that allowed the "zombie banks" to continue to operate under impaired capital conditions. 129 He too argues in favor of FDIC seizure. 130 Another Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, claims that the bailouts amount to "ersatz capitalism" whereby gains are privatized but losses are socialized. 131 Such a reality will create "perverse incentives, worse even than the ones that got us into the mess."
132 He points out that in the past the government, through the FDIC, seized large banks, including Continental Illinois in the 1980s.
133
Stiglitz argues that the government could have generated $7 trillion in loans 134 if it had diverted the TARP money to the creation of a "good bank," which would be stripped of the problem bank assets that have proven so troublesome. 135 Recently, two IMF economists studied financial crises around the world from 1970 through 2007. 136 They found that the best economic policy for resolving such crises is cognizant of the large costs involved in redirecting a nation's wealth from taxpayers to financial firms and their creditors.
137 These costs include the amount transferred to banks plus the misallocations of capital and distorted incentives that can harm GDP for years.
138 Moreover, they found that any delay in resolving a financial crisis Other high profile economists joined in these critiques. See Rogoff, supra note 117, at A14 ("We need to put most of the major financial institutions through accelerated bankruptcy. We're not going to get normal lending until we do that. We also need to lay down a regulatory framework so this doesn't happen again."); Paul Romer, Let's Start Brand New Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A13 ("If the TARP funds go to existing banks, much of them will end up stuck in financial institutions that are still bad after the transfer. We know from the previous round of TARP that giving more capital to bad banks generates very little net new lending."). 136 137 Id. at 3 (noting that "sound policy approaches to financial crises [include] recognition that policy responses that reallocate wealth toward banks and debtors and away from taxpayers face" costs). 138 Id. (concluding that costs include the amount of "taxpayers' wealth that is spent on financial assistance and indirect costs from misallocations of capital and distortions to incentives that may result").
is often very costly as insolvent firms tend to become more insolvent. 139 Instead, authorities must act with speed and shutter hopelessly insolvent firms while reserving assistance for those firms that can survive.
140
Forbearance results in greater costs and increased credit contraction. 141 Finally, help for distressed borrowers is essential for the successful resolution of bank crises. 142 Those nations that fail to pursue these often politically painful steps frequently suffer prolonged stagnation.
143
Much of the learning regarding appropriate policy responses to a financial crisis emanates from the experience of Japan over the last twenty years. Japan attempted to bail out its banks and succeeded in creating zombie firms which sapped economic growth. 144 Japan's problems started with a bursting real estate bubble and a bursting stock market bubble leading to large losses for the Japanese financial sector.
145 This led to a typical credit crunch, as banks and other financial institutions pared risk. 146 However, Japan exacerbated the credit crunch by keeping zombie banks afloat; such banks face incentives to continue lending to zombie firms rather than recognizing losses that could tip the banks into insolvency. 147 Zombie firms, in turn, depress investment, employment growth, and productivity sector-wide as even non-zombie firms struggle to compete against the zombie firms. 148 As professors Hoshi and Kashyap conclude: "We believe that the depressed restructuring that accompanied the financial crisis has left Japan with a dysfunctional banking system that misallocates funds and a perverted industrial structure in which subsidized inefficient firms are 139 Id. at 4 ("Existing empirical research has shown that providing assistance to banks and their borrowers can be counterproductive, resulting in increased losses to banks, which often abuse forbearance to take unproductive risks at government expense."). 140 Id. at 30 ("A successful bank recapitalization program tends to be selective in its financial assistance to banks, specifies clear quantifiable rules that limit access to preferred stock assistance, and enacts capital regulation that establishes meaningful standards for risk-based capital."). 141 Id. at 4 ("The typical result of forbearance is a deeper hole in the net worth of banks, crippling tax burdens to finance bank bailouts, and even more severe credit supply contraction and economic decline than would have occurred in the absence of forbearance."). 142 Laeven & Valencia, supra note 136, at 31 ("To relieve indebted [borrowers] . . . from financial stress and restore their balance sheets to health, intervention in the form of targeted debt relief programs to distressed borrowers and corporate restructuring programs appear most successful. Such programs . . . tend to be most successful when they are well-targeted with adequate safeguards attached."). 143 Id. at 30 ("Above all, speed appears of the essence. As soon as a large part of the financial system is deemed insolvent and has reached systemic crisis proportions, bank losses should be recognized . . . and steps should be taken to ensure that financial institutions are adequately capitalized."). 144 crowding out potentially profitable ones." 149 In short, the longer the zombie banks operate, the more damage they inflict upon the economy, and the sooner they are "shuttered," the better for the economy. 150 Strong evidence demonstrates that zombie banks plague the U.S. economy. For example, notwithstanding the prodigious government subsidies discussed above, "[m]ore than 150 publicly traded U.S. lenders own nonperforming loans that equal 5 percent or more of their holdings, a level that former regulators say can wipe out a bank's equity and threaten its survival."
151 For its part, the FDIC has recently expanded its list of troubled banks to more than 400. 152 In addition, regulators subjected nineteen of the nation's largest banks to "stress tests" and found that ten of those banks needed to add $75 billion in new capital to meet $599 billion in losses projected over the next two years-and that was after the banks negotiated downward adjustments to capital needs of $68 billion. 153 Experts suggest that the recent changes in mark-to-market accounting standards, discussed above, are also operating to mask bank insolvency and create illusory profits. 154 An influential business consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., recently reported that while the credit securities crisis is winding down, the bank loan portfolio crisis is just starting-because credit securities were marked to market while loan portfolios are written down only upon actual default. 155 McKinsey's research suggests that total credit losses from U.S. debt will be between $2.5 trillion and $3.5 trillion, of which only $1 trillion have been recognized. 156 Consequently, by any reasonable measure the nation's financial sector is deeply troubled. insolvent but for government subsidies and lifelines. 159 Zombie banks harm the entire financial sector, even non-zombie firms, because they will naturally use their government subsidies to support higher deposit rates and lower interest costs, thereby squeezing industry profit margins. 160 Right now zombie banks are "irrationally" risk-averse and are hoarding capital. 161 Zombie banks also will rationally fear government restrictions on their operations (especially, in a CEO primacy regime of corporate governance, those relating to executive compensation) and hoard capital in order to repay the government. 162 They will also hoard capital to avert government intervention if they know large losses are imminent. 163 Thus, these firms become insolvency sponges, sucking in vast capital just to remain viable.
These zombie banks have already harmed the U.S. economy. The money that the government pumped into the financial sector failed to reignite lending. 164 According to a New York Times survey of investor conferences, bankers frankly admitted they were more interested in hoarding capital or making acquisitions than expanding lending. 165 Moreover, because the government gave the most money to the most insolvent banks, much of the money went to fill holes in balance sheets to alleviate their insolvency; thus, lending fell by twice the amount at banks that received TARP funds relative to banks that did not receive such funds. 166 The Federal Reserve reports that banks have long been tightening their credit standards, and this has continued unabated since the disbursement of the TARP funds. 167 The FDIC depicts in the following chart the resulting contraction in bank lending: 168 The above chart demonstrates, that in fact, bank lending sharply contracted immediately following the massive government sponsored bailouts. It is difficult to determine if the contraction of lending led to the contraction in the U.S. economy or if the causation runs in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the contraction in GDP tracks the contraction in lending very tightly, rather than preceding it: GDP turned negative in third quarter of 2008 and plunged the next two quarters. 169 Therefore, it is probable that the contraction in lending caused the contraction in GDP. Instead of lending money, the banks are hoarding capital, as reflected in the massive build-up of reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks. Banks are required to maintain reserve balances; however, excess reserve balances exploded immediately following the government bailout efforts, 171 and as of late July of 2009, banks held $794 billion in excess reserves. 172 As economists Aaron Edlin and Dwight Jaffee put it: "Thars the problem folks." 173 Economist Nouriel Roubini argues that this capital hoarding is a material factor slowing the economy today, and in the longer term, threatens to cause higher inflation when banks finally do regain confidence in their balance sheets and the economy. 174 Certainly, policymakers should be credited for averting a repeat of the Great Depression. 175 Yet, the extraordinary efforts of policymakers around the world as well as in the U.S. have not been costless: "governments have been spending and borrowing like never before." 176 In the U.S. total commitments exceed $12 trillion, and actual expenditures 171 175 Id. ("In the last few months the world economy has been saved from a near-depression. That feat has been achieved by a range of extraordinary government stimulus measures . . . governments have pumped liquidity, slashed policy rates, cut taxes, primed demand and ring-fenced and back-stopped the financial system."). 176 Id.
amount to $4 trillion. 177 Governments have also resorted to printing money, which is never costless.
178 Without this massive government intervention the economy would have suffered "headlong GDP contraction."
179 Not even the U.S. government can afford to accumulate debt and expand its monetary base (which includes the reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve Banks) at such a furious rate without adverse consequences. 180 The debt burden of the U.S. is now projected to double, to 80% of GDP by 2014, which "amounts to a fiscal train wreck" that could cause creditors to demand higher risk premia on U.S. obligations. 181 Additionally, when banks cease to hoard capital and make loans, the money supply will expand rapidly and therefore threaten inflation.
182
In other words, the U.S. faces the potential of higher interest rates and higher inflation as a result of the excessively costly and ill-tailored bailouts of 2008-2009. Economists suggested other alternatives to the subprime bailouts. As mentioned, a number of economists have suggested the creation of a well-capitalized "good bank" rather than government efforts to plug the vast insolvency holes now plaguing the bailed-out banks. 183 Others suggest that instead of trying to keep fundamentally insolvent financial institutions afloat with government money (saving their unsecured creditors and their managers the horrors of bankruptcy or FDIC reorganization), the government create a streamlined bankruptcy regime. 184 Creditors would swap into equity positions and be denied government funds.
185
The government could provide prepackaged bankruptcy terms aimed at achieving a rapid resolution of the bank's insolvency. 186 The result would be recapitalized banks, ready to lend, at no cost to the taxpayer. 187 The overarching point is that lending could have been restored without stuffing billions, even trillions, into the pockets of creditors who never bargained for a government guarantee.
Thus, the bailouts of 2008-2009 suffer from numerous and serious macroeconomic flaws. First, the bailouts failed to reignite lending and stabilize the economy and instead led to a historic capital hoarding of U.S. government funds. Second, the bailouts left current management of banks largely intact and protected their compensation agreements, creating incentives for managers to conceal losses and keep their firms afloat so that 177 Id. 178 more compensation payments will be forthcoming. Third, the bailouts did not shutter hopelessly insolvent firms, which means that at some firms, losses are likely to expand. Fourth, the bailouts did not materially assist distressed borrowers so as to contain future losses. Fifth, and most importantly, the government clearly affirmed it would rescue certain financial firms, and thereby, created powerful incentives for both managers and creditors to gorge on risk and propagate new financial crises. The bailouts of 2008-2009 simply do not enjoy much support from the world of macroeconomics. 188 In the end, this may be the most massive misallocation of social wealth in history, particularly in light of the obvious social needs of our citizenry-ranging from education to healthcare. 189 Nor have economists and business commentators greeted the Obama Administration's reform efforts with much warmth. 190 The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Gary Stern, states that "the [Obama Administration's] proposal fails to come to grips with TBTF and therefore leaves the financial system considerably more vulnerable than it needs to be to future bouts of instability." 191 The core problem with the Administration's proposal is that "there is nothing in the . . . proposal designed to put creditors of large, systemically important financial institutions at risk of loss." 196 Nevertheless, the Administration's proposal simply identifies banks that are deemed TBTF and subjects them to enhanced regulation, while explicitly expanding the TBTF subsidy to more and larger financial institutions.
197
III. SUBPRIME BAILOUT LAW On many levels the entire subprime fiasco resulted from a failure of law. One key example is the perverse incentives the law created under the auspices of the pseudo-legal doctrine of TBTF. 198 This legal monstrosity, which always relied on political extortion over formal law, held that major firms (or at least some undefined set of major firms) would be effectively guaranteed against insolvency by the U.S. government. 199 American law had long provided two insolvency regimes: one for banks and another for ordinary commercial enterprises. 200 If a bank fails (or becomes "critically undercapitalized"), then the FDIC seizes control and ousts management. 201 Typically, the FDIC pays off insured depositors and therefore enjoys priority in the distribution of assets with uninsured depositors. 202 General unsecured creditors and shareholders are typically last in priority and are thus not likely to fare well. 203 However, Congress has authorized the FDIC to make payments to unsecured claimants based upon estimated recoveries in order to provide liquidity for such claims. 204 The failure of Washington Mutual in September of 2008 illustrates the soundness of this resolution regime. 205 Although it was the largest bank failure in history, it cost the government insurance fund nothing, and its assets were immediately transferred to another bank. 206 While general unsecured creditors took large losses, there is little evidence that its failure led to more widespread instability. 207 A second regime for managing insolvency is bankruptcy, which applies to all firms other than banks. Bankruptcy can be triggered at the instance of creditors or the firm itself. 208 Unsecured creditors typically fare poorly in bankruptcy--their claims are subject to an automatic stay and are usually paid out in the form of newly issued securities by the reorganized firm. 209 Thus, bankruptcy proceedings eliminate issues of moral hazard as unsecured creditors are put at risk of loss, and management contracts are treated as just another creditor claim. 210 On the other hand, bankruptcy should not be confused with liquidation; in fact, Chapter 11 reorganization specifically promotes the ongoing operations of the firm by staying collection activity (which may otherwise prove disruptive) and making special financing available. 211 Neither bankruptcy nor FDIC receivership law contemplated the massive bailouts of 2008-2009.
In 1991, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act ("FDICIA"). 212 At the time, legislative history showed that Congress "strongly intends that the too-big-to-fail policy is hereby abolished." 213 The FDICIA did apparently narrow the circumstances under which the FDIC and the Fed could extend assistance to open banks--or at least many commentators so concluded. 214 Nevertheless, even after the FDICIA, the FDIC retained power to protect uninsured creditors to avert "serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability." 215 The Fed also still had the power to open the discount window to non-banks. 216 This is the provision that the Fed relied upon in extending $30 billion in assistance in connection with the bailout and sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase, 217 as well as the bailout of AIG. 218 The regulatory agencies simply wielded their power in historically unprecedented ways to achieve results without regard to legal expectations. The Fed had never used its power to open the discount window to non-banks on the scale of the AIG or Bear Stearns bailouts. 219 The primary antecedent for the FDIC's use of deposit insurance funds for other than insured deposits similarly lacked precedent in frequency as well as scope-the bailout of Continental Illinois was relatively puny compared to the bailouts of [2008] [2009] . 220 Thus, although Congressional abolition of TBTF seems to have always been overstated, the bailouts of 2008-2009 were nevertheless nearly inconceivable under law.
Of course, Congress could bail out banks simply by changing the law, which they did with the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA"). 221 This permitted far vaster bailouts with an enhanced veneer of legitimacy than the bailouts that had occurred before October of 2008. More than any other government action, this huge bailout bill-which exceeded $700 billion-demonstrated that when political leaders are faced with either the risk of economic catastrophe or massive government support for teetering financial giants, they will choose to spend rather than try to explain later. 222 The role of campaign contributions cannot be ignored. 223 Moreover, the CEOs of the nation's largest financial firms are a small group which commands vast wealth; theories of collective action in the political realm would predict they would hold powerful sway over policy. 224 Perhaps bailouts of large firms, especially financial firms, are inevitable. 222 According to at least one account calls from constituents were overwhelmingly against the EESA. Stewart, supra note 62, at 79. 223 See sources cited supra notes 1-6. 224 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 22-36 (arguing that smaller groups seeking concentrated legislative benefits will face lower costs to organizing and will therefore be more effective than diffused groups which face free riding problems); Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1233 (2006) (stating that special interest negotiation taking place between lawmakers and organized groups with wealth can be "well-hidden"). 225 In the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, there was a general run on the money market mutual fund industry that in turn led to a freeze in short term commercial credit markets that necessitated a $4 trillion government guarantee of money market funds. Stewart, supra note 62, at 75. composition of the board, their nominal supervisors. 226 Further, the law clearly permits larger financial firms than in decades past as well as more complex business activities. This operated to make financial firms more interconnected as well as larger, raising the systemic risk of large failures. Changes in law, such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 227 and the Financial Modernization Act of 2000, contributed to these trends. 228 These legal developments appear to have increased the stakes of the TBTF doctrine.
I posit that reforming the TBTF issue requires a durable legal framework that imposes appropriate incentives for the key agents of the creation of TBTF firms-CEOs. 229 Efforts to regulate the risks taken by firms that are TBTF lead to regulatory forbearance and indulgences. 230 In the current crisis, we have seen Congress itself apply pressure to relax accounting rules.
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Once firms become TBTF, it seems unlikely that policymakers will risk the wrath of the public if they permit the real economy to follow the financial sector into an abyss. 232 This political reality is compounded by the access bankers enjoy as a result of their prodigious campaign contributions. 233 Moreover, many of the key regulators are likely to be at least cognitively and culturally captured by their colleagues in the banking industry. 234 Commentators predicted that firms that were TBTF would in fact be bailed out-and in fact they were. 235 Thus relying upon wise regulation, regulatory ambiguity, or effective regulators to spare the costs of bailouts, financial crises, credit crunches, liquidity traps, and distorted incentives is not likely to work.
This reality highlights the problems with current proposals for dealing with the TBTF problem. Formalizing incentives for becoming TBTF will simply create clearer, more powerful distortions. 236 Relying on enhanced regulation cannot be effective if regulators forbear.
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Recent scholarship also suggests that identifying firms that are TBTF in advance is very difficult. 238 The problem is that the temptation to bail out large financial firms is apt to differ from any set of firms identified in advance. 239 Thus, any policy that attempts to pre-identify firms that would be rescued (and impose enhanced regulation) is not likely to be successful. 240 Finally, there is a complete absence of empirical evidence that the disincentives from regulatory penalties, such as enhanced capital requirements, leverage limits, or other detriments, outweighs the cheaper capital and government guaranteed compensation payments that attract managers to TBTF in the first instance. Consequently, the key to controlling costs from firms that are TBTF is to create the proper incentives for those who control the decisions leading to TBTF status-the firm's CEO who typically controls the firm's destiny. 242 We have seen that these CEOs do not appreciate federal input into their compensation. 243 They are therefore likely to abhor having their compensation agreements discharged as they would be in bankruptcy and FDIC receivership.
244 Under 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(e), the FDIC has the power to set aside certain agreements. 239 Id. (noting that "regulators are reluctant to allow the official failure (closure) of a distressed financial institution under particular economic or financial market conditions if its solvency could have been resolved under more normal conditions. Hence, conditions/context are sources of systemic importance"). 240 Id. 241 In fact, none of these putative regulatory burdens would seem to affect the supply of capital to a firm at all. See STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 19. 242 Fredrick Tung proposes that banks issue subordinated debt and mandate that managers be paid with such instruments to reduce their risk appetite. Tung, supra note 112, at 340-41. That concept is entirely consistent with the proposal herein. Similarly, William Poole urges that deductibility of interest be curtailed to discourage excessive leverage and that banks issue subordinated debt to impose marketbased discipline upon bank managers. Poole, supra note 237, at 17 ("These two reforms-phasing out the deductibility of interest on business tax returns and requiring banks to maintain subordinated debt in their capital structure-would change the incentives under which firms operate. Firms would be more stable individually and the economy would be more stable."). 243 Second, given the centrality of government subsidies to firms that are TBTF, there is no reason that such instrumentalities of the state, with access to vast sums of federal funding, should ever be shielded in any way from the perpetration of securities fraud. 246 Thus, the protections for those committing securities fraud in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 247 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 248 should be eliminated for the senior officers and directors of firms that are TBTF when they receive government funds or other assistance. 249 This would do no more than expose miscreants to the full brunt of the federal securities laws as they existed from 1934 through 1995, when, as I have previously pointed out, the federal securities laws seemed to operate to minimize scandals and lower the cost of capital. 250 Amending these acts is therefore a costless means of averting the full macroeconomic horrors of bailouts for dysfunctional firms. This is particularly so given that the onset of federal protection of securities "fraudfeasors" has generally been associated with corporate scandals upon corporate scandals with extraordinarily negative macroeconomic costs. 251 Simply put, the PSLRA was a bad idea in 1995, which is particularly heinous when it operates to protect those raiding the federal fisc.
Third, there is little reason why managers with proven track records of crashing their firms to the point of requiring a federal bailout should retain control over such firms. Almost always managers of firms that are TBTF only turn to the government for bailouts in the wake of excessive risk. The bailouts of 2008-2009 were precipitated by pathetically promiscuous risk management. 252 Moreover, new management would have incentives to recognize losses immediately, which economists recognize is the key to reigniting new lending. 253 On the other hand, there may be a need for some managerial continuity, and it is possible that some managers are merely in the wrong firm at the wrong time. Thus, any expenditure of government support for firms that are TBTF should be conditioned upon the presumptive termination of all of the senior managers and board of the failed firm. Only senior managers that are vital to the firm's business should be retained in extraordinary circumstances. Certainly, the norm would be to discharge virtually all of the inept managers that crashed the firm. In FDIC receiverships, the FDIC legally accedes to all the powers of the board and management. 254 Fourth, regulators (weak as they may be) should be empowered to order prudential divestitures of operations anytime a firm approaches TBTF status.
255
I do not propose this reform because of faith in regulators. Instead, if operations can be subject to divestiture, there is less incentive for such acquisitions in the first instance. 256 Creditors will see that such acquisitions are exposing firms to the penalties of being TBTF. Thus, they will naturally view such divestitures as imposing a real risk of non-payment because managers would react to divestures by slimming down their firms or facing sanctions. 257 Meanwhile, if given the power to order divestitures, regulators will almost certainly exercise the power or risk public rebuke if firms are bailed out. 258 Again, this creates disincentives for firms to become TBTF. Divestiture has long been an available remedy to counter excessive power in the context of antitrust law. Indeed, famous examples include the 252 Ramirez, supra note 32, at 52 ("The subprime fiasco rose from one of the 'worst miscalculations in the annals of risk management.'") ( break-up of Standard Oil Co. and AT&T, neither of which triggered the kind of macroeconomic costs associated with TBTF. 259 Fifth, harsh criminal and administrative penalties should follow reckless conduct leading to bailouts. Currently, the FDIC retains broad power to assess civil penalties to those exposing banks to unsafe or unsound practices. 260 There are also broad criminal prohibitions against bank fraud. 261 The FDIC routinely investigates claims against every manager of a failed bank. 262 Given the social costs implicit in TBTF, every disbursement of government funds or assistance under systemic risk provisions should trigger an automatic investigation of civil or criminal misconduct, as well as claims that can lead to recoverable assets to defray bailout costs. 263 Because TBTF banks impose disproportionately large social costs, the penalties for causing losses to such institutions should be more severe than the penalties facing managers of ordinary banks-and should provide substantial administrative fines (commensurate with the compensation earned by the manager) to those managers causing loss through unsafe and unsound practices. Further, any person causing a loss to a TBTF firm through reckless misconduct should face incarceration akin to those convicted of bank fraud. Managers have proven that the temptation to boost profits through excessive risk can be irresistible. 264 Knowledge that bailouts mean subpoenas or worse may give pause to managers who may otherwise fall prey to distorted incentives. Scholars have proposed dedicating Department of Justice personnel to the pursuit of white collar criminals, and this proposal would dovetail with such innovations. meltdown. 274 This he suggests is "common sense." 275 The current regime of TBTF is simply an "affront to our democracy." 276 As such, continuation of the TBTF regime will subvert the confidence of citizens in an evenhanded legal framework governing economic activity and ultimately, in the rule of law itself. 277 
CONCLUSION
The law can adjust incentives and disincentives facing managers of firms flirting with TBTF status. Creating appropriate disincentives and destroying destructive incentives for such managers should greatly mitigate the huge costs implicit in implied government guarantees. Any tally of such costs suggests that strong disincentives and greatly reduced incentives, under a clear rule of law, are urgently needed. Indeed, financial firms are exiting the current crisis bigger than ever while benefitting from greater government commitments. Elites outside the financial system must exercise their influence to weigh against this continued abuse of government resources. Indeed, even elites within the financial system should demand that the gross distortions that caused this crisis be deconstructed, as they themselves suffered great damage from subsidies to a small handful of their competitors.
This article argues that a combination of privatized, administrative, and criminal sanctions can reset and rationalize incentives. If the political heft of the financial sector prevails in securing more certain government guarantees of failure, without legal penalties, the law will have failed to prevent future financial meltdowns.
Moreover, given the huge economic stakes implicit in a continuation of TBTF, as essentially formalized in the Obama Administration's proposal, our legal system will have devolved in large measure into a political free for all insofar as economic law and regulation is concerned. Such an outcome is too bitter to contemplate. For at time when 274 McConnell, supra note 258. 275 Id. 276 As former St. Louis Fed President William Poole states:
Our current bailout world is an affront to democracy. There is much anger in our society. People who were responsible in their use of debt, many of whom are struggling to stay current on their obligations, will eventually be taxed to cover losses incurred by irresponsible borrowers and lenders. We know that many executives of financial firms, despite huge losses, have larger fortunes remaining than most of us can ever dream of enjoying. Taxpayers, in general, will pay for losses incurred by the insolvent, or nearly insolvent, firms these executives left behind. These bitter attitudes in our society today tend to be dismissed as "populist." That is a mischaracterization; no one, whatever his political persuasion, should be willing to accept without complaint wealth transfers of the sort now taking place.
Poole, supra note 237, at 7. 277 TAMANAHA, supra note 11, at 141 (stating that an "indispensible element" of the rule of law is that the "general populace" accepts the "propriety of" the legal system). the rule of law is revered as a source of macroeconomic growth, it will mean that the U.S. has essentially devolved from a system where elites were deprived of the ability to rig the economic system in their favor to a system where economic and political power renders sound policy irrelevant. This devolution in law is inconsistent with continued American economic leadership. Perhaps some new economic power will see fit to minimize costs implicit in the TBTF issue through the rule of law.
